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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) is a new computing
paradigm that spans wearable devices, homes, hospitals, cities,
transportation, and critical infrastructure. Building security into
this new computing paradigm is a major technical challenge to-
day. However, what are the security problems in IoT that we can
solve using existing security principles? And, what are the new
problems and challenges in this space that require new security
mechanisms? This article summarizes the intellectual similarities
and differences between classic information technology security
research and IoT security research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our homes, hospitals, cities, and industries are being en-
hanced with devices that have computational and networking
capabilities. This emerging network of connected devices, or
Internet of Things (IoT), promises better safety, enhanced
management of patients, improved energy efficiency, and opti-
mized manufacturing processes. Although there are many such
benefits, security vulnerabilities in these systems can lead to
user dissatisfaction (e.g., random bugs [2]), privacy violation
(e.g., eavesdropping [4]), monetary loss (e.g., denial-of-service
attacks [6] or “ransomware” [5]), or even loss of life (e.g.,
attackers controlling vehicles [1]). Therefore, it is critical to
secure this emerging technology revolution in a timely manner.
Although the research community has begun tackling chal-
lenges in securing the IoT, an often asked question is: What
are the new intellectual challenges in the science of security
when we talk about the Internet of Things, and what problems
can we solve using currently known security techniques? This
article summarizes some similarities and differences between
IoT security research and classic information technology se-
curity research.
In discussing the similarities and differences, we take a
broad view of the Internet of Things: we touch upon consumer-
grade technologies (e.g., smart homes, smart appliances, wear-
ables), industrial control systems (e.g., electricity grid, man-
ufacturing), and autonomous vehicles. There are other areas
of IoT such as smart cities that we consider to be outside the
scope of this article. A whole set of privacy issues may arise
from always-connected devices in the physical environment—
this article does not go into depth on these challenges, but
Davies et al. discuss possible challenges and solutions [9].
Our focus is on security and safety issues.
II. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
We classify the similarities and differences based on the
standard computing stack: hardware, system software, net-
*Work done while Amir Rahmati was with the University of Michigan.
work, and application layer. The Internet of Things computing
stack is structured in a similar way: at the lowest layer we
have devices that can sense and effect physical change in
the environment; at the next layer we have IoT platforms
that are software systems that aggregate multiple devices and
controlling software to perform useful tasks; next, we have
various connectivity/network protocols that enable software
and physical devices to communicate with each other; and
finally, we have the application layer running custom code to
control physical processes. We note that it is not our aim to
be exhaustive in our listing of similarities and differences.
A. Hardware Layer
The hardware layer often forms a root of trust in modern
computing systems, and we expect that hardware security
research results developed in the context of desktop, mobile
and cloud systems to transfer in some form to IoT systems.
We organize this section based on two themes: security for
hardware and hardware for security.
Security for Hardware. Recent work has shown the pos-
sibility of hardware-level trojans—malicious components or
instruction sequences that, when triggered, circumvent security
guarantees. Yang et al. recently showed how fabrication-time
attackers can inject analog components that force a flip-flop,
which maintains the processor’s privilege bit, to a target
value [20]. With a large percentage of IoT devices being
manufactured by third-parties (often overseas), hardware-level
attacks are an increasing point of concern.
Given the relative simplicity of IoT devices (e.g., sensors,
microcontrollers) in comparison to general-purpose computer
processors, an open question is whether such attacks can
remain stealthy, and whether post-fabrication testing can be
more effective in determining whether hardware trojans exist
in a chip.
Hardware for Security. Hunt et al. recently discussed “The
Seven Properties of Highly Secure Devices”—two of the
properties directly concern hardware security techniques: a
hardware root of trust, and hardware supported software isola-
tion [15]. Although, the ideas of using hardware mechanisms
to securely store cryptographic keys (e.g., trusted platform
modules, one-time fuses) and to create isolation units (e.g.,
memory management units, SGX enclaves) are similar to
those in classic information technology research, we envision
that many challenges will arise in applying these notions
of hardware security to IoT systems due to their limited
computational and energy constraints.
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These computational and energy limitations can affect
higher-layer security primitives—some IoT devices may not
have very precise real-time clocks, making it harder to imple-
ment even the most basic of network security protocols that
assume the presence of reliable clocks. For example, Rahmati
et al. showed how the natural decay rate of SRAM can be
used as a time-keeper for embedded devices without clocks
(e.g., smart cards) [18].
In general, we observe that although the core notions of
creating hardware to support security primitives is similar
to other computing paradigms, the computational and energy
limitations at the hardware layer can impact security mech-
anisms at higher layers in the context of the IoT comput-
ing paradigm. We also observe conversely that higher-layer
security properties might have to be tuned to the specific
limitations of the IoT device through a hardware-software co-
design approach.
B. System Software Layer
The system software layer consists of firmware, operat-
ing system code, and any privileged system applications or
programming frameworks. This layer builds on hardware
mechanisms for establishing trust and isolation. We believe
that many security principles developed in the context of
mobile, desktop, and cloud computing will be applicable to
IoT platforms—software systems that are similar in function to
operating systems for other computing paradigms. We discuss
a few areas of similarities and differences below, categorized
by security principle:
• Process Isolation: This is a basic primitive that current
operating systems provide—a fault in one process does
not affect other processes on the system. These isolation
guarantees depend on the presence of a hardware memory
management unit (MMU). In small IoT devices (e.g.,
devices with 64KB of RAM), such an MMU is generally
absent. A challenge here is to support the classic notion of
process isolation without an MMU. The Tock operating
system is currently exploring a combination of language-
based isolation features and memory protection units
(MPUs) to provide a process isolation abstraction [16].
In general, although the notion of process isolation is
well-known, enabling it for operating systems of resource-
constrained IoT devices can require new techniques,
while enabling it for IoT devices with more resources
is likely not a challenge (e.g., Nest thermostats, Amazon
Alexa, etc.)
• Access Control: Operating systems protect resources
from untrusted code using access control. A piece of
code is either given a token (as in a capability-based
system) or assigned an unforgeable unique identity upon
which access control rules are expressed. Building an
access control system for a particular domain is often
challenging. Our prior work in analyzing consumer IoT
platforms revealed access control design errors as one
of the security flaws [11]. We performed an empirical
security analysis of the SmartThings platform and found
that access control granularity was not appropriately
designed, and it led to exploitable overprivilege. A funda-
mental reason for such granularity design errors in access
control systems stems from the tension between usability
and security. This tension has manifested itself before,
in mobile operating systems [10], and before them, in
desktop operating systems [7].
Although the notion of access control still applies to IoT
platforms, there are new challenges in the usability aspect
of designing such systems. For example, most prior access
control systems dealt with virtual objects such as files and
processes. In the IoT space, the objects of access control
are physical devices and intuitive physical operations. An
interesting challenge is exploiting our natural intuitions
about physical objects while designing an access control
system for IoT platforms. For example, Fernandes et al.
recently discussed the notion of a user-perceived-risk-
based access control system for IoT platforms [11].
• Information Flow Control (IFC): Access control is a
gatekeeper—once code obtains access to sensitive re-
sources, access control does not provide any further pro-
tection. We analyzed a set of smart home platforms [13],
and found that current platforms only use access control.
IFC is a promising technique to control how (untrusted)
code uses its access to sensitive resources.
Although IFC is not a new concept, as evidenced by the
multitude of proposed systems for various domains, the
challenge lies in applying it meaningfully to a specific
domain. For example, FlowFence is a recent proposal for
consumer IoT frameworks that enables a data-flow-graph
approach to IFC due to the structure of IoT apps [12].
Furthermore, the kinds of confidentiality properties for
environments such as homes are well-studied, however,
the kinds of integrity properties that we might need, which
are arguably more important in IoT, is less well-studied.
• Software Updates: Updating software is a fundamental
security practice to patch security bugs, and include
additional features once devices are deployed. For smart-
phones, personal computers, and cloud services, updating
software is a well-understood, secure, and common prac-
tice. However, for physical devices in the IoT, a number
of challenges arise:
– Upgrading software might require a shutdown of the
physical processes under control [8], that could have
economic impact.
– Updates might require re-verification of compliance
policies for safety critical devices in sensitive instal-
lations like factories and hospitals.
– Updates on computers in tertiary network functions
(e.g., a business network) can have unintended effects
on a physical process. A prominent example of a
negative effect of this kind was the shutdown of a
nuclear reactor due to a software update on a computer
in the plant’s business network [3]
– Many IoT devices deployed in the field (such as in
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concrete bridges) can be difficult to physically access,
and might be intermittently powered (by harvesting
power from vibrations). Updating the software on such
intermittently powered devices is a challenge that is
generally not faced in classical computing systems.
– IoT devices may not be updateable fundamentally
because there is simply no update channel built by
the manufacturers. In this case, we need to revisit our
notion of a software update of the host (the device),
and include notions of network-based patches [21].
Although software updates for security are a well-
understood concept, designing update systems for the IoT
poses new challenges because of the unique properties
of the physical processes that are under the control of
software.
• Authentication: Passwords are currently the most widely
used mechanism to authenticate users to their IoT devices,
platforms, and services. But, they are also a major point
of concern because weak passwords are pervasive, and
have recently enabled large denial of service attacks from
botnets [6]. Although there are lightweight techniques to
obtain statistical estimations of password strength,1 weak
passwords are still rampant. We do not view enforcing
reasonable strength passwords (non-default) as a technical
difference from IT security, but we view it as a usability
challenge. Some proposals suggest moving away from
password-based authentication schemes [15].
Open challenges in authenticating users to IoT devices
include: (1) Are activity-based biometrics (e.g., gait,
heart-rate) a better alternative to passwords given that
IoT devices interact with physical phenomena? (2) IoT
devices do no necessarily have classic I/O (e.g., no
display in Google Home)—this can affect authentication
schemes like passwords. Can we design authentication
schemes of equivalent security for different interaction
modalities?
C. Network Layer
Connectivity Protocol Diversity. The network layer in the
Internet of Things is marked by a variety of physical media and
communication protocols. Part of this connectivity protocol
diversity stems from the relative infancy of this technology,
and part of it stems from the constraints imposed by devices or
from the physical spaces that host these devices. For intermit-
tently powered devices, short-range protocols like BLE (Blue-
Tooth Low Energy) and NFC (Near Field Communication)
are vital in conserving energy. For devices located in existing
infrastructure, protocols like Physical Line Communications
avoid expensive infrastructural costs. Similarly, Visible Light
Communication can be useful because lights are ubiquitous in
physical spaces. This protocol diversity disrupts the operation
of network scanning—a fundamental security practice. We
highlight this using the following case study:
BLE “port” Scanning Case Study. In BLE, a rough analog of
1https://github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn
a TCP port is a service UUID. A device can support multiple
UUIDs that define the kinds of functionality it provides.
There are UUIDs for fitness machines, heart monitors etc.2
When a BLE device is in the disconnected state, it sends
out advertisements that can help controllers (or scanners)
discover the device, and attempt connections. Advertisements
contain rudimentary information, and therefore, connections
are required in order to get a full list of the services a device
supports. Therefore, for a scanner to reliably work, a device
would have to be in a disconnected state as a BLE device only
accepts a single connection for its services, unlike TCP ports,
where multiple simultaneous connections can be serviced on
the same port. This introduces randomness into the scanning
process as the scanner will have to “try again” at a later point
in time in the hope that the BLE device is in the disconnected
state. Furthermore, if a BLE device is in the connected state,
it does not send advertisements, further complicating scanner
operation.3
Therefore, scanners for IoT protocols are currently very
network-specific and only offer limited coverage (BLE scan-
ners will only be useful for BLE devices but it is common
for physical spaces such as a home to contain devices using
different connectivity protocols). This is in stark contrast to
the Internet in general where TCP/IP is a constant presence
for online services where network scanning is generally used.
Port scanning is further made difficult in the consumer IoT
space due to the practice of placing devices behind a hub or
router. Network scanners situated outside such a network will
not be able to conduct internal scans.
As each protocol has its own notions of how two peers
communicate with each other, it is unclear how network
security practices such as port scanning translate to networks
of devices that use various IoT protocols.
Re-purposing of Networking Technologies in Unforeseen
Ways. As discussed above, a common IoT system architecture
for smart homes is to connect multiple devices to a hub. If all
the home IoT devices use WiFi as a connectivity protocol, then
a WiFi router can be a hub. This kind of configuration poses
new security challenges that WiFi was not designed to support.
For example, it is very difficult to ensure that only a WiFi-
enabled presence detector should affect a door lock. Such an
isolation boundary is useful because there could be multiple
devices on a network, some of which might be malicious or
compromised through bugs. The isolation unit would serve
as defense in depth against such a situation. Furthermore,
as discussed in §II-B, some devices may not have update
channels, necessitating other means of updates. A central hub
like a WiFi router can be in a good position to apply updates
in the form of filters for known malicious traffic patterns.
Simpson et al. discuss the design of a WiFi home hub that
can perform such security functions [19].
2See https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/gatt/services for a list of
definitions.
3Sophisticated scanners could try to jam existing connections to force them
to drop.
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In the context of smart homes, we observe that hubs like
WiFi routers are being increasingly used to support IoT device
networks. Adapting these hubs to support security properties
such as isolation as first-class citizens is an open challenge.
Anomaly Detection in the Network. As defense in depth,
detecting misbehaving devices on the network is a common
and well-deployed security practice in many computing areas.
The main challenge in obtaining useful results from anomaly
detectors is tuning it to produce a low number of errors—
either raising a flag for benign behavior or not raising a
flag for malicious behavior. This challenge arises due to the
fundamental complexity of the devices we typically connect
to a network—general purpose computers like mobile phones,
desktops, and servers. These devices perform multiple func-
tions, and lead to complicated network traces that make it
difficult to characterize “normal” behavior. In contrast, IoT
devices are simple and have a single purpose. This can
translate to simpler network dynamics, and hence easier to
model behaviors ultimately leading to a lower number of errors
in anomaly detectors. Recent work in the context of industrial
control systems show promising results—Formby et al. show
how predictable network characteristics of relays and circuit
breakers can be used to reliably fingerprint them [14].
A physical process evolves as per physical laws in a
generally predictable fashion. A garage door of a certain
mass takes a specific amount of time to close, and an oven
of a certain volume would heat up to a specific temperature
in a predictable amount of time. We envision that models of
these physical processes can be used to reduce the errors in
anomaly detectors. In contrast, general purpose computers, by
definition, do not have well-defined models of behavior when
applications running on them are taken into account.
D. Application Layer
The application layer in IoT is no different from other
computing paradigms—it runs customized code for end-user
scenarios. In this section, we consider two ways in which IoT
application behavior can affect security.
Physical Co-Relations. Consider a simple If-This-Then-That
rule that closes a garage door after 9PM. If a speaker were
placed in the vicinity of the motors controlling the door, it
would record a specific acoustic pattern for a specific amount
of time whenever the door closes. There is a natural physical
co-relation between this acoustic pattern and the closing of the
garage doors.
The natural co-relations between physical phenomena could
act as feedback channels that IoT platforms can use to
approximately monitor physical processes for deviations from
expected behavior. If deviations occur, then it could imply a
failure or a security issue.
Machine Learning and Control of Physical Processes.
In recent years, machine learning (and deep learning) has
found wide applicability to many domains of computing—
deep learning robots can learn to grasp objects, and the Nest
thermostat can learn and then control HVAC settings auto-
matically. However, recent work has shown that deep learning
algorithms are susceptible to adversarial manipulations of their
inputs—attackers can craft inputs that look indistinguishable
from benign inputs to humans, but can be interpreted in a
completely different way by machines. For example, tampered
images that are fed into a vision algorithm running on an
autonomous vehicle can make the vehicle believe a stop sign
was a yield sign, causing a possible crash at an intersection.
Building robustness into ML algorithms against such attacks
an active area of research whose details are beyond the scope
of this article. We refer the reader to [17] for a more thorough
treatment of the topic.
As more physical processes come under the control of
machine learning algorithms, their vulnerabilities in adver-
sarial settings will become pressing security and safety issues.
Classic IT security has often applied ML to security problems
(e.g., malware detection), however, only recently has work
begun on securing the ML algorithms themselves.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Broadly, the similarities between classic IT security research
and IoT security research are the basic secure software and
hardware construction principles that have been developed in
other computing paradigms. The differences form a spectrum
of new intellectual challenges. On one end of this spectrum,
challenges arise in applying and adapting known security
principles to make them work for the unique challenges posed
by the IoT computing paradigm. We believe that overcoming
many of these challenges will involve a cross-layer co-design
approach. For example, due to limited energy availability,
hardware security mechanisms might need to be purpose-built
depending on the specific higher-level security property we
wish to enforce—it is not possible to efficiently accommodate
a one-size-fits-all security mechanism.
At the other end of the spectrum, the nature of physical
processes and the nature of IoT devices lend themselves to
the construction of new security mechanisms. As discussed,
natural co-relations between physical phenomena can be ex-
ploited to detect security and safety failures. Similarly, the
predictability of physical processes is another avenue that
can be used to detect anomalous events. Finally, introducing
ideas from the control engineering world into IoT platform
construction (e.g., specialized feedback loops) could lead to a
more secure and safe IoT.
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